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ABSTRACT 
Executive IPO Stock Option Compensation and IPO Underpricing 
Jianguo Wu 
Do executives influence IPO underpricing when they stand to gain from the 
increased value of their IPO stock options? The present thesis examines this question for 
422 U.S. software IPO firms from 1996 to 2000. The specificity of the software industry 
coupled with the bull market of the late 90s affects the cost-benefit tradeoff an executive 
faces with respect to the offer price of an IPO. I consider the possible interplay of traditional 
underpricing theories (signaling, asymmetric information, litigation and managerial 
influence) with high human capital intensity in a tight labor market. I correct for an 
exhaustive list of variables including: pre-IPO stock ownership, underwriter quality, VC 
backing, founder-manager. OLS regression results show no difference in underpricing 
between option-granting and non-option-granting firms; however, greater underpricing is 
significantly associated with higher total dollar value of stock options granted to top 
management and/or CEOs. After controlling for endogeneity, I find no evidence that there's 
relation between option grants and underpricing. However, the bubble years 1998-2000 
have significant explanatory power, under all specifications, with regard to the greater IPO 
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1. Introduction 
Do executives influence IPO underpricing when they stand to gain from the 
increased value of their IPO stock options? Recent literature has demonstrated that 
executives take actions to maximize the value of their options by timing option grants and 
company information announcements (Heron and Lie (2007)). On the other hand Lowry 
and Murphy (2007) find no evidence of a significant effect of executive IPO options on 
IPO underpricing. In the present study, I test this relationship in depth by focusing on a 
particular industry unique with its high dependence on human capital - the software 
industry. 
Using hand-collected compensation data from 422 software companies which 
conducted IPOs in 1996-2000, I examine the effect of executive IPO stock option 
compensation on IPO underpricing and stock performance of newly-public U.S. software 
companies. 
I find that the decision to grant options is not related to IPO underpricing. 
Interestingly, the dollar value of executive stock options appears to be associated with 
underpricing1. However, after controlling for endogeneity, using simultaneous equations 
framework, option grants do not have explanatory power for IPO underpricing . I 
conclude that with human capital intensity, using different measures of underpricing and 
different specifications, there is still no significant relationship between executive options 
and IPO underpricing. 
1
 Indicated by our OLS and Heckman results. 
2
 Indicated by our Hausman tests and 3SLS results. 
1 
I focus on the software industry because it involves risky and large investments in 
innovative activities, where the outcomes are unanticipated, human-specific, and long-
term in nature. The demand for software executives and other critical employees is 
intensive and competitive leading to high turnover rate of talented individuals. To cope 
with this problem, one of the most important organizational innovations that have 
emerged from the new-tech industries in 1960s3 is the use of IPO stock options to attract 
and retain top executives and key employees and align their long-term incentives with the 
interests of the company . Furthermore, start-up companies-without established income 
streams are often cash strapped and options can be the only source of compensation 
available (Davis and Edge, -2004). 
This study tracks the initial returns and stock performance of software company 
IPOs from 1996-2000. Over this period, the number of companies going public is 
substantially higher and these IPOs are substantially more underpriced. As the software 
industiy is very human-capital intensive in research and development activities, more 
companies willing to be listed demand more software engineers. For these new issuing 
firms with cash constraints while facing a challenge to attract human capital during the 
bubble years, issuing option grants was especially attractive . 
Prior literature has not used the dollar value level of stock options conditional on 
the choice of granting option compensation as a long-term incentive to top executives 
3
 Known as the technology explosion in the industries of mainframe computer, color television, space 
travel, nuclear power and telecommunications in 1960s (Delves, 2003). 
4
 Stock options, for instance, provide the highest portion of the performance-based incentive compensation 
received by top executives in U.S. internet related business (Chen and Kleiner, 2004). 
5
 Hence, I include 1997-2000 year dummies in most of my regression equations to capture the year effects. 
2 
possibly because of concerns about non-tradability. If the variation in the dollar value of 
option grants is very high, the coefficient on a grant option dummy may very well be 
insignificant. If, however the incentive effect to manipulate the IPO offer price kicks in at 
a sufficiently high threshold level in the dollar value of the option grant, then 
constructing a continuous variable to capture this effect is worthwhile. Precisely this 
constitutes the first contribution of the present work. 
Second, I recognize and examine carefully the simultaneous relationship between 
executive option grants and IPO underpricing. I control for the inverse effect of the 
expectation of post-IPO performance, as a proxy for unobserved firm quality, on option 
grants using a Heckman sample selection filter. At the first stage of this procedure, I 
estimate the probability of whether firms choose to grant options to top executives 
through a sample selection regression and based on this likelihood, I further run an 
outcome regression to capture the potential effect of expected underpricing on the dollar 
value of the option granted. 
Third, this thesis focuses on the software industry during the dot-com bubble 
years from 1996-2000. I attempt to capture and analyze the human capital intensity 
effect, as well as the bull market effect of the late 1990s. My summary statistics indicate 
that during this time period, the average IPO underpricing level of software IPOs 
amounts to more than three times that of the average IPO across all industries. It is not 
surprising that executive option grants reached such high levels precisely in this industry 
and during this time period as an incentive-based compensation. Hence, prior results on 
3 
the determinants of IPO underpricing based on data for all industries may not capture the 
specificities of the software industry. 
Description of Executive Stock Option Grants 
Stock option compensation gives employees the right to purchase the stock of 
their company at a specified price for a specified period of time (Turzak, 2007). The 
typical pay combination for top executives or CEOs in the U.S. currently is mainly (85%) 
composed of long term incentives-stock related remuneration-such as stock grants, 
restricted stock grants and stock option grants while the rest is fixed compensation (salary, 
bonus and other cash compensation) (Ibanez-Frocham, 2008). 
Among long-term incentive compensation, stock options are more efficient 
compared to other equity instruments and are becoming more and more popular and 
wide-spread internationally since 1960s. For instance, Liang and Sharpe (1999) report 
that the total dollar value of new option grants per employee at large Standard and Poor's 
(S&P) 500 firms quadrupled between 1994 and 1998 and Weisbenner (2000) also 
documents that the total number of option grants at large public firms has grown by 50 
percent from 1990 to 1998. Recent statistics from the S&P Execucomp database further 
support this tendency: the median value of executive stock option amounts to 71.2 
percent of the total compensation for the S&P top executives in 2007 , a 109 percent 
increase from 34 percent in 1992 (Cadman, Klasa and Matsunaga ,2007). 
6
 EQUILAR (April 2008), retrieved from http://www.equilar.com/press_20080410.php 
4 
There are two types of employee stock option compensation in the United States: 
incentive stock options (ISO) and nonqualified stock options (NQSO)7. For ISOs, a pre-
specified group of employees receive a pre-determined number of options according to 
their personal compensation plan which is endorsed by the entire shareholder base of the 
company . NQSOs are usually utilized as compensation method for senior executives and 
CEOs and they are also the only type of options that are awarded to nonemployee board 
of directors. The offer price at the IPO is often given as the exercise price in the 
prospectus. To illustrate, an executive employment agreement may specify that if certain 
conditions are met, the executive will receive a certain number of options with the 
exercise price set equal to the IPO offer price at some future dates. 
According to Yermack (1997), for "most executives in major companies, stock 
options are awarded once each year by a compensation committee of the board of 
directors, acting under the authority of periodic shareholder votes9. Compensation 
committees exercise discretion over the size and timing of stock option awards, and these 
parameters fluctuate substantially across companies and over time." Yermack (1995) also 
states that the increasing frequency and size of executive option pay since the 1990s has 
attracted attention from shareholder activists and government authorities such as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Accounting Standards 
7
 As illustrated in the company's SEC prospectus filings. 
There are several limitations on ISO: 1) once approved by the firm owners, the options must be granted 
during subsequent 10 years and may not have an exercise date longer than 10 years after the grant date; 2) 
the exercise price must be at least 100 percent of the offer price. If an employee possesses more than 10 
percent of the firm's common shares, then the exercise price must be at least 110 percent of the offer price 
3) the number of options for each employee is restricted to 100,000 divided by the offer price at the time of 
the grant. 4) The options cannot be transferred except in the event of death. NQSOs do not have those 
limitations. 
9
 Occasionally CEOs receive multiple awards. 
5 
Board (FASB), all of which announced regulations encouraging shareholder inspection of 
executive compensation. 
The effect of IPO option grants to executives in newly public companies is not 
unambiguously positive or negative from either managerial or financial point of view. 
Fife (1995) shows from a managerial perspective that option compensation establishes 
common objectives among top executives and the firm's owners and reduces agency 
costs, improves the retention of key executives, which demonstrates to potential investors 
that executives are committed to the firm and provides top executives with an opportunity 
for capital accumulation. On the other hand, granting stock options, according to Fife 
(1995), can generate some significant negative effects for private owners. For example, 
stock options force the firm owner to answer to minority shareholders, may result in 
failure to create incremental value for the money because of the increasing human capital 
cost, may risk the firm's "S-Corporation"10 status if there are too many shareholders and 
leave the company with little choice but to repurchase the options if the IPOs does not 
take place. 
From a financial perspective, option grants align executives' incentives with the 
interests of the firm's owners. Options are granted to reduce the moral hazard problem 
that stems from executives who possess very little of the firm's assets they manage. A 
substantial body of theoretical work, starting with Jensen and Meckling (1976), posits 
10
 S-Corporation is an eligible domestic corporation that can avoid double taxation once to the shareholders 
and again to the corporation. Generally speaking, an S corporation is exempt from federal income tax other 
than tax on certain capital gains and passive income. On their tax returns, the S corporation's shareholders 
include their share of the corporation's separately stated items of income, deduction, loss, and credit, and 
their share of non-separately stated income or loss. Retrieved from United States Department of the 
Treasury, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0„id=98263,00.html 
6 
that option grants can align managers' incentives with that of common shareholders. In 
line with Jensen and Meckling (1976), Core and Guay (1999) and Rajgopal and Shevlin 
(2002) also give evidence that granting options is consistent with firm value 
maximization. 
Hanlon et al. (2003) further empirically investigate whether option payoffs are 
connected with incentive alignment effects (they refer to it as optimal contracting). They 
concentrate exclusively on top-five executives and find that $1 of Black-Scholes option 
value granted to executives during the previous five years leads to $3.88 of undiscounted 
future operating earnings. Consistent with optimal contracting, they find that expected 
option values associated with proxies for incentive alignment are positively related to the 
future earnings per share. 
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2004) also argue that contrary to the majority perspective 
attributing business scandals like Enron to the flaws in its long-term incentives, the stock 
option compensation does not deteriorate, but rather minimizes agency costs and 
improves internal control and corporate governance, under both regulatory change (new 
governance guidelines from the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ) and 
legislative change (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). 
However, Hall and Murphy (2002) and Lambert and Larcker (2002) argue that 
options are an inefficient means to compensate executives. Researchers also give 
evidence that managers abuse option grants for their own benefit by controlling the pay-
setting process and compensate themselves in excess of the level optimal for shareholders 
(also known as rent extraction perspective) (Yermack,1997; Aboody and Kasznik, 2000). 
7 
Some authors claim that options also enable management focus on timing and 
maximizing option value instead of running the firm. Aboody and Kasznik (2000) 
demonstrate that firms accelerate the release of bad news and delay the disclosure of 
good news prior to stock option grant dates most likely to lower the options' exercise 
price. Carpenter and Remmers (2001) find that managers take advantage of their inside 
information to time the exercising of options. Bens et al. (2002) suggest that managers 
cut R&D expenditure to fund stock buybacks for option plans in order to avoid EPS 
dilution. Finally, option grants can lead to management free-riding problem. Bebchuk and 
Fried (2005) state that " executives can profit even when their companies' 
performance significantly lags that of their peers, as long as market-wide and industry-
wide movements provide sufficient lift for the stock price." If a substantial fraction of 
stock price increases is due to industry or market movements, rather than to firm-specific 
factors that might reflect the executives' own performance, granting options would be a 
windfall and jeopardize the shareholder's benefits. 
Around most IPOs, some of the issuing companies decide to launch stock option 
programs for their top management. Stock options are regularly granted with the IPO or 
at pre-defined points of time (in this thesis I refer to both IPO and pre-IPO options as just 
IPO options). Issuers also determine the maximum quantity of shares to be allocated on a 
preferred basis to friends and families of the company and its management. 
Do top executives or CEOs of software companies intentionally increase their 
personal wealth by underpricing their IPOs by a greater amount (or setting lower offer 
price) at the expense of company's common shareholders? In other words, is there a 
8 
significant difference in underpricing between software firms which grant IPO stock 
options to top executives and those which do not grant such compensation? Does the 
dollar value of those stock options actually matter in explaining IPO underpricing for 
U.S. software companies in 1996-2000? Do insiders extract private benefits by IPO 
underpricing? Do managerial incentives matter in explaining IPO underpricing? 
To answer those questions, I first take a glance at the average magnitude of stock 
option grants for the software industry and the market as a whole. Option-holding 
executives (of software companies) extract an immediate benefit from underpricing 
known as the money left on the table. It is the product of the difference between the first 
market price and the IPO offer price (strike price) multiplied by the total number of 
shares held by executives. 
Benefit . . . .\* Number of shares 













companies in the 
sample 
$13.3 billion 
All IPOs over 
1996 to 2000 
$ 83.23 billion11 
My estimate for the average benefits for top executives is $77 million from IPO 
underpricing12. Adding up the dollar benefit of IPO underpricing accruing to executives 
11
 Ritter J. (2008). Some Factoids About the 2007 IPO Market, http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter. 
12
 Calculated by the total option value awarded to management team divided by the number of executives 
in each company. 
for the IPOs in my sample, gives $13 billion, which amounts to nearly 16 percent of the 
total money left on the table for all industries ($83.23 billion of total benefits) during 
1996-2000. This magnitude requires careful consideration and partially motivates us to 
take a closer look at executives' incentives to maximize their personal dollar benefit from 
IPO underpricing in this particular industry. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 lists relevant prior 
literature on the topic of IPO underpricing and the relation between executive stock 
option compensation and IPO underpricing; Section 3 describes the sample and data. In 
Sections 4 to 6 I report the theoretical background, descriptive statistics and empirical 
results; Section 7 concludes and discusses. 
10 
2. Literature review 
First, I broadly review three main theoretical frameworks on underpricing. I then 
investigate more detail the work that focuses on the relation among executive stock 
option awards, corporate governance and IPO underpricing, introducing the managerial 
influence hypothesis. 
2.1 Underpricing 
The literature has established three principal hypotheses on the determinants of 
IPO underpricing: signaling theory, information asymmetry theory, and litigation risk 
theory (Ibbotson et al., 1994). 
2.1.1 Signaling Theory 
Signaling theory suggests that investors may possess different information from 
the IPO firm and its underwriters, therefore any information or news released from the 
firm may convey a signal to potential investors about the quality (high or low) and the 
future performance of the firm. By underpricing their IPO stock, the high quality 
companies or so called "good companies" convey to investors a costly signal of their firm 
quality. This demonstrates that they are able to surrender the benefit of current IPO 
proceeds because they believe that they will get compensated for the difference through a 
combination of future seasoned equity offerings receiving more favorable higher pricing 
11 
and a more favorable market response to dividends, and by using current funds for high-
quality projects thereby improving firm value. 
From a theoretical standpoint, Allen and Faulhaber (1989) first develop 
arguments that "good" firms signal their quality to potential investors by underpricing 
their initial issues to a greater extent, which further enables them to raise more capital in 
future seasoned offerings at more favorable rates. 
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) develop a three-parameter signaling model with two 
attributes, two signals and a continuum of signal levels and attribute types to explain new 
issued stock discounting or underpricing. They posit that "both the fraction of the new 
issue retained by the issuer and its offering price convey to investors the unobservable 
intrinsic value of the firm and the volatility of its cash flows", which lends support to the 
signaling theory of underpricing Allen and Faulhaber (1989) developed. 
The model in Welch (1989) also predicts that "good" issuing firms do not mind 
IPO underpricing since higher price at seasoned offerings eventually makes up for the 
intentionally lower IPO price. Welch explains that IPO underpricing can drive low-
quality firms to reveal themselves as "bad" firms. Because the marginal cost of 
underpricing for high-quality firm is lower than that for low-quality firm owners; high-
quality firm owners can signal their superior information and prospects to investors. To 
replicate "good" firms, those "bad" firms have to spend signaling cost and other tangible 
and intangible resources to imitate the real activities and attributes of "good" firms. 
Higher signaling costs then force a replicating firm to reveal itself as a "bad" firm. 
12 
To summarize, all these theoretical papers propose signaling models that issuers 
send their superior information to outsiders about the value of their projects and the 
variance of their cash flows by underpricing their IPOs. These models also indicate that 
compared with firms with low IPO underpricing, firms with large IPO underpricing are 
more likely to issue larger amounts of equity in their seasoned equity offerings 
subsequently and those seasoned offerings are issued sooner after their IPOs and these 
issuing firms tend to undergo a smaller price drop on the date of the SEO announcement. 
However, Jegadeesh et al. (1993) and Garfinkel (1993) find little empirical 
support for the signaling story. Jegadeesh et al. (1993) find that it is the market returns or 
market movements following the IPOs, not IPO initial returns, that significantly 
positively relate to the probability, frequency and size of subsequent seasoned equity 
offerings. Their evidence indicates that IPO underpricing does not play a unique role in 
predicting future seasoned equity offerings and suggests issuers do not have to rely on the 
expensive underpricing mechanism to signal to potential investors and market for future 
equity issues. 
GarfinkePs (1993) findings support Jegadeesh et al. (1993) that IPO underpricing 
has little signaling effect on both the likelihood and the abnormal return of seasoned 
equity offerings. He also finds that underpricing has no significant influence on the 
13 
likelihood of insider sale in the open market, which is contradictory to the signaling 
theory that firms with greater underpricing tend to exhibit greater insider selling13. 
Michaely and Shaw (1994) is another empirical study, which utilizes a sample of 
947 IPOs that went public during the period 1984-1988 to test several signaling models 
of IPO underpricing. Consistent with the above papers, they conclude that IPO 
underpricing is substantially negatively related to the frequency and size of seasoned 
equity offerings and also negatively related to future earnings and dividend payouts, 
which is inconsistent with the signaling theory of underpricing. 
Lastly, Spiess and Pettway (1997) examine the relation between initial public 
offerings and seasoned equity reissues for 172 industrial firms that went public during 
1987-1991 and then made subsequent seasoned equity offerings within three years of 
their IPO. They find little evidence that "good" firms choose IPO underpricing to signal 
their firm quality and they also find no evidence that firms recoup the cost of IPO 
underpricing in either higher reissue proceeds or in greater wealth for the firm's initial 
owners in their subsequent offerings. 
Since the empirical literature shows controversial evidence that IPO underpricing 
plays a unique role in anticipating subsequent offerings (as signaling theory argues), it 
should be more appropriate to construct the common controlling variables in a more 
conservative method under a theory that is better supported by empirical research. 
Information asymmetry theory is a case in point. 
13
 An insider sale is defined as the open market sale of 10,000 or more shares by an owner or director 
within two years of the IPO, while the sale of smaller share blocks is more likely to represent a liquidity 
trade. 
14 
2.1.2 Information Asymmetry Theory 
Information asymmetry occurs when one group of participants has better or 
timelier information and news about an issuing company or an IPO than other groups. 
Since all market participants do not equally have access to information they need for their 
decision making process, the existence of information asymmetry introduces an element 
of market inefficiency. (D'Craz and Kini, 2008) 
Beatty and Ritter (1986), Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Baron (1982) give 
theoretical evidence that information asymmetry among various parties can also explain 
IPO underpricing. In particular, IPOs with greater uncertainty and significant information 
asymmetry are underpriced to a greater extent to compensate for the greater costs that 
market participants spend on learning firms' intrinsic values. Beatty and Ritter (1986) 
report an equilibrium in which the ex ante uncertainty14 of an IPO value expected by 
outside investors is significantly positively related to its expected initial return. They also 
contend that this underpricing equilibrium is enforced by investment bankers who have 
experience underwriting IPOs, and any investment banker who "cheats" on the 
underpricing equilibrium by persistently underpricing either by too little or by too much, 
will be penalized by the marketplace. Therefore, I include underwriter reputation as my 
control variable when examining the relation between option grants and underpricing. 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) also lend support to Beatty and Ritter (1986) in that 
underpricing is directly related to the ex ante value of investors' information. They 
14 
They use two proxies for ex ante uncertainty, those are (i) the log of one plus the number of uses of 
proceeds listed in the prospectus, and (ii) the inverse of the gross proceeds. 
15 
further test the effect of underwriters on the initial returns and they demonstrate that the 
existence of an underwriter can reduce IPO underpricing by selling IPOs repeatedly to 
the same regular investors. 
Baron (1982) further emphasizes the importance of underwriters by presenting a 
theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for new 
issues. According to Baron (1982), the underwriter-investment banker is always better 
informed about the capital market than the issuer; therefore the optimal option for an 
issuer prior to the IPO is to surrender the rights of deciding the offer price to the better 
informed banker in order to deal with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
resulting from the informational asymmetry. His model demonstrates a positive demand 
for investment banking advising and distribution services with respect to the issuer's, 
decision to issue publicly for the first time. Therefore, there is strong evidence that 
underpricing exists for many other reasons except option grants and I make sure to 
control for these effects before concluding that option grants are also associated with 
underpricing. 
Many papers, including Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Clarkson and Merkley 
(1994) find empirical evidence for the importance of information asymmetry as a 
determinant of underpricing. Megginson and Weiss (1991) lend support for the 
certification role of venture capitalists in IPOs by examining the influence of venture 
capitalists on IPO underpricing and subsequent ownership structure of IPOs. They 
compare VC backed IPOs and non-VC backed offers from 1983-1987 and their results 
indicate that VC backed firms are more likely to attract underwriters and auditors with 
16 
higher reputation than non-VC backed IPOs. They conclude that venture capitalists are 
able to lower the costs of going public and significantly lower IPO underpricing and 
underwriter compensation, by reducing the information asymmetry between the issuing 
firm and potential investors and financial specialists such as underwriters and auditors. 
As for the effect on the IPO ownership structure, they find that venture capitalists are not 
using the IPO as an opportunity to sell some of their holdings and realize a return on 
investment. Therefore, I also include venture capitalist dummy as a control variable when 
examining the relation between option grants and underpricing. 
Clarkson and Merkley (1994) study the relation between ex ante uncertainty and 
underpricing in the Canadian context. They come to a conclusion that the greater this 
uncertainty is, the greater will be the underpricing. They base their argument on the 
winner's curse problem. To induce the uninformed investors to remain in the IPO market, 
issues need to be underpriced. 
Overall, the evidence testing the information asymmetry theory is more 
supportive than that for the signaling theory. Therefore, I mostly base my theoretical 
justification on information asymmetry arguments and incorporate control variables 
determining underpricing based on the information asymmetry theory, while recognizing 
the contributing effect of signaling theory. 
17 
2.1.3 Litigation Risk Theory 
The third theory which has gained popularity recently is the litigation risk theory. 
The litigation risk hypothesis according to Ibbotson (1975) and Tinic (1988) is that firms 
intentionally underprice their shares as a form of insurance against future liability (costs). 
A firm contending to be listed, should be prepared to bear the potential costs of litigation, 
and these costs, like settlement payments, can be very substantial. To reduce the 
likelihood of incurring litigation costs, firms and underwriters should reduce the 
possibility of being sued by underpricing their new issues by a greater amount to lower 
the potential damages that plaintiffs can be awarded. Tinic (1988) tests the litigation-risk 
hypothesis by comparing the underpricing of IPOs prior to and subsequent to the 1933 
Securities Act, which substantially increased the legal exposure of IPO issues, and 
concludes that the 1933 Securities Act increased expected litigation costs and therefore 
resulted in more underpricing. Hughes and Thakor (1992) extend Tinic's analysis in a 
game-theoretic setting and specify the conditions required for equilibrium underpricing. 
Hensler (1995) formalizes Tinic's model using a utility-maximization single period 
model. Both models similarly predict a positive relationship between litigation risk and 
underpricing. 
Lowry and Shu (2002) examine the relation between underpricing and litigation 
risk emphasizing the importance of cross-sectional approach and controlling for 
endogeneity. They find that firms with higher litigation risk underprice their IPOs by 
significantly greater amounts, which supports Ibbotson (1975) and Tinic. (1988). Their 
evidence also demonstrates that firms experiencing more underpricing significantly lower 
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their litigation risks and reduce the possibility of being sued, especially for lawsuits 
occurring closer to IPO dates. Controlling for endogeneity of IPO underpricing and 
lawsuit probability, they find support for both the insurance and deterrence aspects of the 
litigation-risk hypothesis. 
In line with the information asymmetry theory, IPOs backed, by venture capitalists 
and high-ranked underwriters would be expected to have better governance and 
operations and thereby lower the risk of getting sued (litigation risk). In this case the 
company would not need to use higher underpricing to avoid lawsuits. I capture this 
effect by controlling for underwriter quality and whether an IPO is venture capitalist 
backed. 
2.2 Executive Stock Option Compensation and IPO Underpricing-
Managerial Influence Hypothesis 
Some studies suggest that IPO and pre-IPO executive stock option compensation 
and IPO underpricing are positively related, and that IPOs are significantly more 
underpriced for IPO companies which issue option compensation to top executives than 
those which choose not to. This relationship is known as the managerial influence 
hypothesis. According to Rocholl (2005), approximately 80 percent of German Neuer 
Markt IPO firms grant IPO stock options to their top managers during 1997-2001. His 
empirical results indicate that issuing companies and in particular, their insiders do not 
demand less IPO underpricing per se, by using a dataset of prospectuses for 290 issuing 
companies and he arrives at a conclusion that these IPOs are significantly more 
underpriced than IPO companies in which no top managers hold IPO options. He 
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documents that insiders derive substantial private benefits from IPO underpricing and put 
more money on the table. 
Taranto (2003) also provides evidence that the utilization of stock options 
explains a substantial part of the cross-sectional variation in IPO underpricing. He relates 
this result in U.S. IPOs to tax considerations by executives who exercise their options at 
the IPO. It is debatable since options are mainly granted shortly before the IPO and 
become part of the lock-up agreement making it impossible for top managers to sell them 
at the IPO. The author also states that underpricing allows the use of equity and options 
as a substitute for cash when paying employees, strengthening strategic alliances and 
rewarding important customers. Taranto further finds that insiders with options can also 
benefit from IPO underpricing: many CEOs gain private wealth when their offering is 
underpriced, firm option use is positively related to underpricing and options use is 
positively related to venture capital ownership. 
Similarly, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) present proof supporting the 
managerial influence hypothesis of IPO underpricing. They show that CEO pre-IPO 
ownership and underpricing are negatively related. They explain that selling behavior and 
ownership structure affect the intensity of monitoring and the degree of realized 
underpricing and conclude that initial returns are greater when insiders sell fewer shares 
at the offer price and when insider ownership stakes are smaller and more fragmented. 
They also find that options granted to executives and their friends and family and 
underpricing are positively related. 
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In addition, Yermack (1997) claims that managers' influence over the terms 
(timings) of their stock options results in an approximate two percent increase in the 
value of their options, suggesting that CEOs benefit from favorable timing of stock 
option awards relative to corporate news announcements. Aboody and Kasznik (2000) 
also provide evidence that CEOs of firms with scheduled awards make opportunistic 
voluntary disclosures that maximize their stock option compensation. They suggest that 
top executives have compensation-related incentives to delay good news and rush 
forward bad news. Newer evidence in Heron and Lie (2007) documents wide-spread 
practice of timing executive option grants. 
To conclude, the managerial influence hypothesis of IPO underpricing indicates 
the possible explanatory power of the company's ownership structure, executive 
compensation structure (particularly long-term performance-related incentives) and 
management's disclosure of their compensation and companies news announcements on 
the initial returns at the IPO date. 
However, recent literature generates different results and explanations. Lowry and 
Murphy (2007) find no support that U.S. firms granting IPO options have higher first-day 
returns than firms not granting such options for all industries from 1996 to 2000, 
challenging prior literature. Their results are robust to controlling variables in the 
literature commonly linked to underpricing, and are inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
executives with IPO options extract private benefits by setting a lower offer price. They 
point to one possible explanation, namely the governance characteristics of issuing firms 
such as concentrated executive ownership and active potential investors place restrictions 
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on executive's IPO rent-seeking activities. One aspect of this study sheds more light on 
this debate. 
The present work has a broader scope because it contrasts the relation between 
option grants and underpricing to the relation between option grants and 6-month and 1-
year stock performance. Aboody (1996) finds a significant negative relation between the 
estimated value of outstanding employee stock options and the long term stock price, 
after controlling for the mechanical relation between option values and share prices. 
Aboody (1996) calculates the value of the options using estimates of inputs to an option 
pricing model in a same way as this thesis does. Following Aboody (1996)'s 
methodology, however, Rees and Stott (1998) find a significant positive relation between 
stock-based compensation expense and share prices and returns. 
Kedia, Simi and Mozumdar (2002) also examine the effect of option grants to top 
executives on firm performance as measured by abnormal stock returns for 200 largest 
NASDAQ firms from 1995 to 1998. Their evidence suggests that option granting firms, 
especially those awarding options to attract and retain their key employees generate more 
positive abnormal stock returns for their shareholders. They also conclude that option 
grants by firms with financial constraints create an excess return suggesting that stock 
options may be one mechanism through which start-ups and other cash strapped firms 
like software firms can compete in the labor market effectively. 
I acknowledge the potential endogeneity problem in my empirical tests and apply 
simultaneous equations approach. Some studies demonstrate reverse causality, whereby 
managerial influence variables (option grants and pre-IPO ownership) are dependent 
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variables and quality related variables are regressors. To illustrate, Weber and Dudney 
(2003) find that a company's board of directors, executive ownership and option grants 
are related. They note that CEO's tenure affects the level of option compensation because 
longer tenure CEOs would be expected to earn higher salaries and other long-term 
incentives. They also examine the effect of a CEO's age and ownership of the company 
on compensation level, controlling for company age, total assets, board size, and the 
presence of institutional holdings, founder-led dummy and education dummy. Their 
results show a positive correlation between CEO age and option compensation, as well as 
between CEO ownership and CEO compensation. Likewise, regarding the determinants 
of option grants, Roosenboom and Goot's (2006) empirical results provide evidence that 
employees are more likely to be compensated by options when the company has higher 
past accounting and stock price performance and firm's growth opportunities, while 
employees are not likely to be compensated by options when retained ownership is higher 
and the IPO is backed by venture capitalists. This inverse relation suggests that retained 
ownership and external monitoring can be seen as substitutes for option grants since 
"there is less need to address the agency problem by using stock option grants". 
Roosenboom and Goot (2006) also find that cash constraints play an important role when 
a firm considers an alternative to cash compensation. And finally, option grants are used 
more when employees represent a greater benefit to the firm and when the labor market is 
tight. (Oyer, 2004). All this literature on "reverse causality" improves the empirical work 
in a simultaneous way that eliminates the endogeneity problem this "reverse causality" 
may bring about. Based on the literature above, I further construct equation (2) and (3) to 
address this endogeneity problem. 
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In the present section I examine the prevalent theoretical and empirical evidence 
of IPO underpricing-signaling theory, information asymmetry theory and litigation risk 
theory. I base the research, assemble the control variables and build testable arguments 
on the information asymmetry theory since it provides both theoretical and empirical 
support with respect to IPO underpricing. The literature further introduces the managerial 
influence theory on underpricing and implies that top management has incentives to 
influence the method of long-term incentive awards and the announcement of timing of 




I begin with compensation data for the whole software industry, which includes 
422 software companies15. I retain executive compensation and option compensation 
data, underwriter information and shares owned by the top executives and total shares 
outstanding prior to the IPO. I also gather the information on the firm's management 
team and board of directors, including the board size, CEO age and tenure, etc. For the 
missing records of those 422 companies, I manually collect their executive stock option 
compensation data and ownership information from their IPO prospectus and proxy 
statements in Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) Electronic Data Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system between year 1996 and year 2000 (Final 
prospectuses are identified on EDGAR as document 424B at http://www.sec.gov). 
Next I use the Securities Data Company (SDC) database to download U.S. market 
new issues over the period 1996-2000. There are 2,28516 new issues during this time 
period. I collect a complete IPO record: Ticker, Issuer, Date of IPO, and Business 
Description, SIC code, High Tech Industry Dummy, State, Nation, Industry, Firm Age, 
Principal Amount, Proceeds Amount, Offer Price, Shares Filed, Amount Filed, Total 
Shares Offered, and Stock Price of 1 day, 1 week, 6 months and 1 year after the offer. I 
then calculate the percentage change in the stock price with respect to 1 day, 1 week, 6 
month and 1 year as stock performance indicators of increasing length. I use the 1-day 
and 1-week returns to evaluate IPO underpricing, whereas I interpret the 6-months and 1-
15
 Generously provided by Prof. Martin L. Martens. The 422 issuing companies constitute the whole 
software industry from 1996 to 2000. 
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 Ritter J.(2008) Some Factoids About the 2007 IPO Market, http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter 
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year as realized performance measures In addition, I obtain Log (Total Assets), 
NASDAQ price index, filing range/adjusted price and two types of IPO (dummy 
variables) - whether it is venture capitalist backed or not and whether it is founder-led 
IPO or professional-led IPO from SDC. To control for the effect of market return at the 
time of the IPO on underpricing, I collect from CRSP 15-day daily returns on 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ composite index before each IPO date and compound them 
annually to obtain the Index market return. As an alternative measure of underpricing, I 
also use "price update", defined as the percentage change between the offer price and the 
midpoint of the filing range (as stated in a preliminary prospectus). An advantage of this 
approach is that it does not rely on the assumption that the first aftermarket closing price 
is an unbiased estimate of firm value, an assumption that Loughran and Ritter (2004) 
suggest might not hold during the dot-com bubble period. Nevertheless, this method 
assumes that all bargaining over the offer price occurs at the pricing meeting, when the 
offer price is set, rather than when the underwriter is chosen prior to the setting of the 
initial filing range. 
I proceed to match the "422-firm" dataset and all 2,285 IPO issues during the 
same period. After the match, 377 out of the 422 companies can be perfectly matched 
with variables obtained from SDC and CRSP. The remaining 45 companies could not be 
matched because different ticker was used in the two data sets. For these 45 companies, I 
manually match by names and/or issue dates. 
Executive ownership is defined as shares owned by the top executives as a 
fraction of shares outstanding prior to the IPO. Top underwriter names are extracted from 
26 
"422 company data" and I manually match the reputation ranking for each issuer from: 
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. Underwriter ranks range from zero to 9.1, with 
higher ranks representing higher-quality underwriters. In general, underwriters with a 
rank of 8.0 to 9.1 (on a scale of 0 to 9.1) are considered to be prestigious national 
underwriters. Those with a rank of 5.0 to 7.9 are considered to be quality regional or 
niche underwriters. Underwriters with a rank of 0 to 4.9 are generally associated with 
penny stocks; many with ranks of 3.0 or lower have been charged by the SEC with 
market manipulation. 
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To calculate the total value of stock options, I first calculate the Black-Scholes 
stock option value and then multiply by the total number of option granted to all top 
executives and CEOs for each company management team. To calculate Black-Scholes 
stock option value, I manually collect each IPO company's stock price 5*, strike price K, 
years to maturity for every option grant T, volatility a, and risk free rate of return r. The 
measurement and source for each input are listed as Table 5 Panel A shows. 
I compute an estimate of the stock option value for each listed software company. 
I calculate the dollar value of option grants of the CEO and of the entire top management 
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 See Black, F. & Scholes, M. 1973. The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities. Journal of Political 
Economy 81 (3): 637-654. Black-Scholes option pricing model: the price of the underlying instrument S, 
follows a geometric Brownian motion with constant drift jx and volatility a, and the price changes are log-
normally distributed: 
dSt = ftSt dt + aSt dWt The formula for the price C of a European call option with exercise price Kona 
stock currently trading at price S, The risk free rate of return is r, and the constant stock volatility is a. 
\n(S/K) + (r + ff2/2)T 
C(S,T)=* S<S>(ck) - Ke~-'T<I>(d2) where l~~~~ crVf 
oVT <E> is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
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team by multiplying the Black-Sholes option value times the number of options given to 
the CEO and the management team respectively. 
4. Theoretical Background 
I follow the stylized theoretical model developed by Rochell (2005) and its 
indications on the relationship among IPO option grants, managerial ownership, strike 
price settings, and IPO underpricing. The assumptions of this model are: 
a) Prior to an IPO, a company holds m divisible shares with overall value V. 
Executive pre-IPO ownership is a, i.e., they own am shares of the company, the 
remaining shares (l-oc)m are owned by outside private investors like venture capitalists, 
financial intermediaries and corporate investors. 
b) At the IPO the company grants to executives x executive stock options and 
sells to outside investors y new shares from a capital increase at the offer price OP per 
share. If the management exercise all their options and the company sells all the new 
shares, the number of outstanding shares after the IPO is m + x + y. The volume for x and 
y as well as the design of the executive stock options are determined by the company 
before the IPO. 
c) If the company sets the strike price for the executive stock options equal to OP, 
it receives x*OP from executives or insiders who exercise their options. It also receives 
y*OP from selling the new shares. This means that the price P for the listed share is: 
„ V+y*OP+x*OP P = -
m + x + y 
The insider's post-IPO wealth is W =m a *P + x*P - x*OP, which can be 
rewritten as 
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m ±,V + y*OP + x*OP. *,V + y*OP + x*OP. „__ 
W = ma * ( ) + x* ( )-x*OP 
m+x+y m+x+y 
_ma*V + ma* OP * y + ma* OP *x+x*V-m*x* OP 
m + x + y 
m(a*y + a*x-x) . _„ ma*V + x*V 
-*OP-\ 
m+x+y m+x+y 
To have the manager find it optimal to choose a lower offer price i.e., letting the 
offer price be small enough while maximizing the executive wealth, the coefficient of OP 
in the wealth expression should be negative. That means 
x 1 
a*y + a*x-x<0=>a < =>a <• 
X 
With non-negative x and y and a sufficiently small a (n o bigger than )> 
1 + ^ 
mice * v + cc^ x — x) 
becomes negative. To conclude, with an adequately small ownership 
m + x + y 
a , insiders receiving options benefit from lowering the offer price and causing more 
IPO underpricing because underpricing is evaluated by the difference between stock price 
and offer price divided by offer price: offer price is a smaller value leading to a larger 
value of underpricing. Therefore, this simple model predicts that option grants should be 
positively related to underpricing, while pre-IPO ownership is negatively related to IPO 
initial returns. 
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5. Descriptive Results 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on firms with and without IPO options 
issued to top executives. Approximately 75% of the sample of software firms grant IPO 
option compensation to executives (313 out of 422 firms). The second to fifth rows in the 
table provide some initial evidence that firms with IPO options tend to have greater 
underpricing and performance, in particular: firms with IPO options have average initial 
returns of 81.16%, compared to 50.59% for firms without IPO options, and the difference 
is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
The executives' stock ownership before and after the IPO does not change much. 
The largest shareholders before the IPO are insiders -top executives- who hold a share 
above 64% (62.88% for option granting companies and 69.47% for non-option-granting 
companies). The executive team sells part of their holdings in the IPO, but the average 
volume of these sales amounts only to a small fraction of their pre-IPO holdings (49.58% 
post IPO share for option-granting companies and 52.03% share for non-option-granting 
companies). Insiders sell shares in 64% of the IPOs, they sell on average only 15% (64% 
minus 50%) of their shares in the IPO, but they do not sell all of their shares in any single 
IPO. 
In addition, IPO companies with option compensation grants are venture 
capitalist-backed to a greater extent (73.81% vs. 46.79%), have better underwriter 
ranking (8.38 vs. 7.92), higher offer price ($14.55 vs. $13.21), larger IPO proceeds 
($61.67 mil vs. $58.94mil), larger board size, however larger percentage of them fail 
within 3 years after the IPO compared those without IPO stock option grants. Except for 
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the IPO proceeds, these differences between option-granting and non-option-granting 
companies are significant at least at 10 percent significance level. On the other hand, 
option-granting companies are: founder-led to a lower extent (52.40% vs. 60.55%), 
younger before the IPO (firm age is 6.81 vs. 8.71), have lower assets prior to the IPO 
($51.16 mil vs. $59.31 mil) and lower CEO tenure and CEO age compared to non-option-
granting companies. The differences between the two groups (except for assets size and 
CEO age) are significant at the 1 percent level. The descriptive statistics indicate roughly 
that the IPOs of option granting firms with less pre-IPO executive stock ownership are 
more substantially underpriced, which is consistent with the theoretical notion that with 
an adequately small ownership, insiders benefit from lowering the offer price and greater 
IPO underpricing. The evidence in this table emphasizes the importance of controlling for 
firm specific characteristics in subsequent tests.Table 1 b shows the summary statistics of 
the number and value of stock options among option-granting companies. The average 
number of options to non-CEO executives is much lower than the average number of 
options granted to CEOs (270,435 vs. 537,921). Similarly, the average dollar value of 
options granted to non-CEO executives is also far below the average dollar value of 
options granted to CEOs (4,147,666 vs. 8,294,988). It is notable that the standard 
deviation of the value of option grants to CEOs is high, indicating a big CEO pay gap 
within the software industry. 
Table 2 shows a detailed comparison of the degree of underpricing and 
performance. IPOs of option-granting firms are more substantially underpriced by all 
measurements at the 1 percent significance level. Furthermore, compared to the average 
underpricing level of all IPO issues in the same period including all industries, the 
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software industry IPOs are much more underpriced and this difference is also significant 
at 1 percent level. The variation in IPO underpricing is also much greater than that for all 
industries. This industry specific comparison is consistent with other research. For 
example, Merkley (1986) found that in "hot" industries like software and dot-com 
companies, "where growth possibilities are high and where the proceeds of the issues are 
used to finance new projects, IPOs are characterized by a higher level of underpricing". 
On the other hand, IPOs of firms in more regulated industries or IPOs for which the 
proceeds will be used for financing purposes are much less underpriced. In addition, 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that underwriters, in order to keep their market share in 
the IPO market, need to underprice the issues so that the initial return is commensurate 
with the ex ante uncertainty of the issue. Figure 1 illustrates that option-granting software 
firms have the greatest underpricing, performance and variation, followed by non-option-
granting firms. The overall average IPO underpricing and performance of all industries is 
smaller. Interestingly, the results show a stable level of average underpricing and 
performance from 1 day to 1 year after the IPO, for software companies and for all 
industries, in contrast to the decreasing underpricing after the IPO documented in prior 
literature18. For example, Ritter (1991) examines the long-run (0-36 month after IPO) 
performance of 1,526 IPOs in the period of 1975-1984 and finds that when compared 
with non-issuing matching companies, underpricing does not persist over time and IPOs 
significantly underperform in the long ran. Assuming that post-IPO underpricing is 
decreasing over time, the consistent underpricing in my study can be still attributed to its 
time specificity. Software companies during the bull market years, when the entire 
18
 Ritter (1991), Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993), Jain and Kini (1994), Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah 
(1995), Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) 
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market -particularly NASDAQ-was booming up, were considered over-valued, leading to 
abnormally high stock price over time. It is likely that the descriptive results are 
capturing the market up-turn, therefore I am careful to control for market return in my 
regressions. 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of the number of new issues by year and 
compares average underpricing and performance levels from 1996 to 2000. For the years 
1998-2000, there are more software companies going public and their IPOs are 
substantially underpriced at all levels: there are 54 IPOs in 1998, 178 IPOs in 1999 and 
87 IPOs in the first quarter of 2000 compared to only 48 IPOs in 1996 and 55 IPOs in 
1997. Not surprisingly, the one year performance is negative for the year 2000 IPOs 
possibly due to the steep market decline starting in March 2000. Figure 2 shows that all 
levels of underpricing and performance for software companies in 1998 and 1999 are 
very high while substantially decrease for the year 2000.1 explore the year effects in the 
later part of this thesis. 
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6. Empirical Implications 
The regression equations in this thesis are composed of three parts listed below: 
(1) is the main regression equation where measurements of option grants and pre-IPO 
ownership together with control variables with respect to IPO underpricing and post-IPO 
stock performance. I apply this equation to run the OLS regression. As illustrated in the 
literature, "reverse causality" may exist in equation (1), which could result in the problem 
of endogeneity. To cope with this problem, I then create equation (2) and (3) to generate 
a set of simultaneous equations. I apply this set of equations (1), (2) and (3) to run the 
Hausman test and 3SLS regression. To study the relationship between the IPO 
underpricing and the stock option value, I further apply equation (2) in Heckman filter 
test to correct for sample selection biases. Notation and construction of each variable are 
described in Table 5. 
Underpricing=a0+^(Option Grants)+a2{Pre-IPO own)+a3(Market Return)+ 
+a4 (Size)+a5 (Venture-backed)+a6 (Nasdaq)+ 
+a7 (Underwriter Rep)+ 
+a8(Age)+a9(Founder)+a10i(Year)i+£ (1) 
Option Grants = /30+fix (Quality) + /?2 (Pre-IPO own) + fi3 (Size) + 
+ /?4 (Venture-backed) + /?5 (Underwriter Rep) + 
+ fi6 (Age) + /?7 (Founder) + 
+ /?8 (Board Size) + fi9 (Tenure) + Pm{Year)i +n ,*, 
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Pre-IPO own = y0+yl {Quality) + y2 {Size) + 
+ yA {Age) + y5 {Founder) + (2) 
+ y6 (Tenure) + ylj{Year)j + ^ 
Market Return: "market return" evaluates the market movements before the IPO. 
Loughran and Ritter (2002 and 2004) state that market returns on the stock index are 
positively related to underpricing. 
Firm size (Pre-IPO assets): "assets" is negatively related to underpricing since 
larger companies may disclose more information to outsiders (Lowry and Murphy, 2007). 
Other research also indicates that larger IPO firms tend to outperform smaller ones in 
terms of stock appreciation (e.g., Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Mikkelson, Partch, and 
Shah, 1997). 
Venture-backed dummy: Megginson and Weiss (1991) predict that on the one 
hand venture capitalists endorse the new offer price which decreases going-public firm's 
uncertainty, further decreases the information asymmetry between the issuing firm and 
potential investors, finally lower the underpricing. On the other hand, venture capitalists 
in the issuing company never sell shares at the IPO date and therefore they will 
unsurprisingly seek to reduce "money left on the table" in IPOs, which also leads to 
lower underpricing. However, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) find that venture-backed 
firms experience more underpricing during this period. Taranto (2003) also discusses 
some possible reasons why venture backed IPOs have more executive options and higher 
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underpricing around IPOs. VC backed is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a 
venture capitalist is a shareholder before the IPO and 0 otherwise. 
Nasdaq price index: Table 3 shows both the number of firms listed and the 
magnitude of IPO underpricing tend to increase during 1996 to 2000, in which the 
NASDAQ index climbed from 1,052 to 5,048. Therefore I include the Nasdaq composite 
index to control for this effect. And I expect a positive relationship. 
Underwriter Reputation: Similar to the role of venture capitalists, Carter and 
Manaster (1990) state that higher-ranked underwriters- investment banks also reduce the 
uncertainty of issuing firms before IPOs and thereby further reduce the level of 
underpricing. Loughran and Ritter (2002) also find that underwriter prestige is 
significantly inversely related to IPO initial returns within 1990-1998. However, 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) argue that underwriters tend to have more influence to 
underprice IPO shares, which generates more valuable currency to distribute to current or 
potential investment banking clients, indicating a positive relation between underwriter 
reputation and underpricing. 
Firm age at the time of the IPO is also controlled for since younger firms are more 
vulnerable. Older firms tend to perform better both before and after the IPO (Ritter 1998) 
indicating a positive relationship between firm age and IPO underpricing. 
Founder dummy reflects the third IPO type besides underwriter and venture-
capitalist backed IPO. Wasserman (2003) points out the significance of differentiating 
between founder-led firms and professionally managed firms with respect to IPO 
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underpricing19. Certo et al. (2001) claim that the presence of a founder CEO could sway 
underwriters to suspect that "founders overestimate the strengths and associated prospects 
for long-term success of their firms, and this lack of objectivity may result in poor 
management decisions". Hence, underwriters may set a lower offer price which promotes 
underpricing. Arcand (2008) re-examines the effect of founder-managers on underpricing 
in more detail by explaining the external and internal effects of founder CEO at the time 
of IPO. 20 The results show in the figure below that the IPO firm led by a founder lowers 
the legitimacy, raises the external uncertainty, lowers the offer price and finally raises 
underpricing. This figure also shows that the founder-CEO has a positive influence on the 
long-term post-IPO firm performance. I adopt a dummy variable Founder-led IPO equal 














+3-year Stock Return 
-3-year Survival 
1996-2000 year dummies: to account for the especially high initial returns during 
the "Dot-com Bubble" during 1998-2000 as discussed above, I also include year dummy 
variables. 
19
 Professionally managed refers to hiring an experienced manager from outside the firm rather than the 
founder to serve as the CEO of the firm (Moschella, 2006) 
20
 The external effect is the effect of founder-led firms on potential institutional investors, and thus on IPO 
performance-the level of underpricing and offer price. The internal effect is the effect of founder-led firms 
on the long-term firm performance. 
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6.1 Pair-wise Correlation Test 
Table 4 shows the Pearson correlation matrix among 
underpricing/performance, Option Grant-Dummy/Value, executive pre-IPO ownership 
and other control variables. Underpricing is defined as Underpricing over 1 day through 1 
week and Price Update (defined as the percentage change between the offer price and the 
midpoint of the filing range). Performance is defined as stock return after 6 months and 
after 1 year with respect to offer price after the IPO date. Option Dum is a dummy 
variable that reflects the choice of whether to grant IPO options to the executives or not. 
Option value is the product of Black-Scholes option value multiplied by the number of 
options granted to the management team. Pre-IPO own is defined as shares owned by the 
top executives as a fraction of shares outstanding prior to the IPO. According to Rochell 
(2005), underpricing has an ambiguous effect on insiders' wealth. On the one hand, their 
stock options become more valuable. On the other hand, they suffer from the dilution of 
their shares. Therefore, their incentives depend on their ownership stake and lower 
management stake leads to higher underpricing. By contrast, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 
(2003) find that underpricing is positively related to the proportion of IPO shares offered 
to top executives. 
The results of the Pearson correlation test show that the Underpricing-ld/lw and 
Price Update are positively and significantly correlated with IPO Option Dum at 5 
percent level and Performance-6m is also significantly related to Option Dum at 10 
percent level. Option value is more significantly correlated to Underpricing-ld/lw and 
Price Update at 1 percent significance level. While the underpricing and performance by 
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all measures is negatively related to pre-IPO ownership but this relationship is 
insignificant. Furthermore, the option grant dummy is negatively related to pre-IPO 
ownership at the 5 percent significance level. Market Return, Firm Size, Venture-backed 
dummy, Nasdaq and Underwriter Rep are positively and significantly correlated to 
underpricing and performance; while the correlation coefficient is significantly negative 
for firm Age. The year dummies correlations show that for the years 1996 and 1997; 
there is a strong negative effect on underpricing and performance, while this correlation 
becomes significantly positive in 1999 and 2000 (for 1998, only the effect on Price 
Update and on Performance-ly is significant), confirming the same trend of increasing 
IPO underpricing in the bubble years as shown in Table 3. 
6.2 OLS Regression 
I begin my examination of whether the choice to grant options affects the degree 
of underpricing and performance by running an OLS regression with control variables in 
Equation (1). 
Table 6 reports estimated coefficients of OLS regressions explaining IPO 
underpricing and performance over the 1996-2000 period, including measures of IPO 
Options Dummy and Option Value and executive pre-IPO ownership as well as all the 
control variables discussed above. The coefficients on the Option Dummy are positive 
and insignificant for all underpricing measures (Underpricing ld/lw and Price Update) 
and performance (Performance-6m/ly); while the coefficient on Option Value is 
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significantly positive for underpricing denoted by Underpricng-ld/lw and Price Update. 
Pre-IPO executive shareholdings are negatively related to IPO underpricing and 
performance as predicted, but this relation is insignificant. 
The inferences on the control variables are generally similar to prior results in the 
literature. I find that Market Return and Underwriter Rep are always significantly 
positively related to Underpricing-ld/lw and Price Update. Firm size is only significantly 
positively related to underpricing at the one-week horizon. For all other horizons, there is 
no substantial difference in underpricing between large and small software firms. The 
reason behind this result could be that compared to a regular manufacturing company 
relying on tangible assets, software companies rely mainly on non-quantifiable human 
capital or other intangible assets (Freeware, Shareware and Open Source) not reflected in 
measures of size. The coefficient on the NASDAQ composite index is significantly 
positive for Underpricing -Id and Price Update, but becomes significantly negative in 
one year on post-IPO stock performance. In addition, I find that the year dummies 1998 
and 1999 are significantly positively related to Performance 6m/ly, meaning that the 
bubble years account for some of the post IPO stock performance. Not surprisingly, year 
2000 has a significantly negative impact on underpricing (Price Update), as that is the 
year when the stock market crashed. Firm Age is negatively related to Underpricing-lw, 
Price Update and Performance-6m in the regressions where Option grant is a dummy, 
meaning that younger firms perform better than older firms and this relationship is fairly 
significant. In the option-grant-dummy regressions, the Founder dummy is significantly 
negatively related to Price Update, while the Venture-backed dummy is significantly 
positively related to Price Update. Firm Size positively relates to Underpricing-lw. 
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The principal results are in line with Lowry and Murphy (2007), finding no 
evidence that U.S. software companies granting IPO options have higher first-day returns 
than firms not granting such options when considering a variety of specifications and 
control variables. In addition, I also find that there's no clear relationship between the 
choice of whether to grant options and first-week returns, Price Update, 6-month and 1-
year stock performance. However, I do find that the dollar value of stock options granted 
to executives is substantially positively related to underpricing when evaluated by 
undepricing-ld/lw and price update models. Among option granting companies, 
underpricing appears to depend more on the managerial influence theory. Executives' 
principal concern is to maximize their benefit by affecting the discounted value and terms 
of options: the time to maturity and exercise price of their options, and more importantly, 
the expected volatility of the firm (according to Black-Scholes option value). They then 
deliberately set lower offer price or more underpricing so that they can make more money 
in the long run to compensate this volatility risk and mitigate this uncertainty when they 
are able to exercise the options. 
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6.3 Year Specific Valuation 
Table 7 analyzes the effect of executive IPO option compensation on different 
measures of underpricing and performance for each of the years from 1996 to 2000.1 find 
no evidence of significant relationship between IPO underpricing (Underpricing-Id/lw 
and Price Update) and the executive option grant dummy or option value for the years 
1996-1998. However, I find that in 1999 and 2000, the total dollar value of stock options 
granted to top executives is positively related to underpricing. The control variables also 
have more explanatory power in 1999 and 2000. The pronounced Market Returns effect 
shows that the overall market movements substantially explain the large level of 
underpricing and performance of software companies in 1999 and 2000. 
6.4 Heckman Two-Step Sample Selection Model 
So far, I have examined the managerial influence on the level of IPO underpricing 
and performance. Option-holding executives may intentionally set lower offer price for 
their options resulting in immediate post IPO price increase or a longer-term performance 
effect. I am also interested in the managerial influence on the choice of being granted 
stock options when they have expectations with respect to underpricing and post-IPO 
performance. The "Quality-3 year fail dummy" in regression equation (2) captures the 
management expectation of the quality of the firm. If the "3-year fail" dummy is 1, this 
new issue would be delisted in the subsequent 3 years, which could be anticipated by 
executives and they may push for greater IPO underpricing. This may lead to lower 
number and value of options the executives will receive today. I then test the inverse 
relationship between the levels of IPO underpricing and the total dollar value of the stock 
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options awarded to either top executives or CEOs among the firms granting options. 
Simply regressing the total dollar value of IPO stock options on the underpricing among 
the group of companies who issue stock options would be biased because there is a 
concentration of values of the dependent variable at a limit (in this case $0, I only 
observe value of options that is worth more than $0). In other words, OLS estimates are 
biased since the dependent variable is not continuous and unbounded. According to 
Heckman (1979), I should do a two-step sample selection regression: 
First step: I use a selection regression as Equation (2) shows to determine the 
probability of censoring (the probability to grant options or the probability that the value 
of the options is observed among the firms) and then; 
Second step: I use an outcome regression to determine the value of dependent 
variable (the dollar value of these options) given the fact that the value of the options is 
observed. 
The form of sample selection model according to Heckman (1979) is 
Selection Equation is: 
z* = w[a + et 
Where, Z is the event that issuing companies grant options to executives. If they 
choose to grant options, z=l; otherwise z=0. w is a set of predictive variables. 
zt = 0 i / z t * < 0 ; 
zt = lifz*>0 
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Outcome Equation is: 
y* = x'iP + ut 
yt = yt if zi=i 
yt not observed if zt = 0 
Where Y is the option value under z equals 1. I begin by estimating a probit 
model for the probability that z=l, in my case, for the probability that an IPO company 
grants option compensation to their executives. This model is estimated with all of my 
observations using a set of predictive variables called w and yielding a coefficient 
vector a. 
pr(Zi = 1) = 4>{w[a) 
Next, I estimate the expected dollar value of the options y, conditional on z=l, 
and x: 
EiyAz = l,Xi) = xtf + E(ut\Zi = 1) 
=xlp + E(ui\ei> w[a) (a) 
Then I evaluate the conditional expectation of u in (a): 
£(ut|et > Wia) = paeau-^^(b) 
Substitute (b) into (a) 
E(yt\z = l.Xt) = x\B + pOeOu^^ (c) 
Use OLS to regress y on xt and Xi=—L: 
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E(yt\z = l,xi)=xl0 + 6X(d) 
To estimate the OLS, I first obtain the probit results, i.e., the probability for the 
IPO companies to grant options to their executives and, for the subsample for which 
option value is observed (z=l), I compute the estimate of (p over<£, also called the 
inverse mills ratio, denoted by X. Then, for this same subsample, I use OLS to regress the 
dollar value of the stock options y on x and on my estimate of A. This will yield estimates 
of the vector of coefficients (/?), and of 0, which is the covariance between u and e. 
Equation (d) shows that the resulting estimates of the vector /?, in general, will be biased 
if the variable X had been omitted. I report the results in Table 8. 
Table 8 shows estimates for the two equations. The results for the selection 
equation (dependent variable is option dummy) are on the bottom and the results for the 
outcome equation (dependent variable is option value) are on the top. To illustrate, for the 
Undpericing-ld, I can see on the bottom that there are 301 observations in the dataset, but 
that 68 of them are censored (z=0), which means I do not have observations on the 
dependent variable in the outcome equation (y). STATA gives an estimate for p = 1, and 
a test statistic that rejects the null that p = 0. The two steps (equations) are correlated, so 
indeed the Heckman filter is appropriate for the data. 
The principle result from the Table 8 is that underpricing-Underpricing ld/lw and 
Price Update are positively significantly related to the total dollar value of the stock 
options awarded to the top executives, and the level of significance is 1 percent. I do not 
find that Performance-6m/ly is related to option values after controlling for censorship. 
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Pre-IPO assets (Size) is positively and significantly related to Option Value while 
Founder-led IPO dummy appears significantly negative with respect to Option Value. 
The selection model reports a higher probability to issue options to executives when the 
IPO company is venture backed and has a higher-rank underwriter. 
In summary, there is still no difference in underpricing between the firms which 
grant stock options and those which choose not to. The relationship between IPO 
underpricing and the total dollar value of stock options to top executives remains 
significantly positive. 
Following the same method, I get similar results on the relation between IPO 
underpricing and the total value of stock options granted to CEOs only. The results are 
shown in Table 9. Underpricing-ld/lw and Price Update are significantly positively 
correlated to the dollar value of the stock options granted to CEOs only and this 
relationship (bigger z value) is much stronger than the relationship between underpricing 
and the option value granted to the top management team, which indicates that CEOs 
have more control over the offer price compared to other executives. Furthermore, pre-
IPO assets are significantly positively related to the dollar value of options granted to 
CEOs only, while the coefficient estimate on firm age is significantly negative, meaning 
that younger firms are more likely to issue larger value of stock options to their CEOs to 
attract and retain them in the management team. In the selection models, compared to 
OLS, for CEOs only Pre-IPO Own is significantly negatively related to Option Dummy. 
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6.5 Hausman Test for Endogeneity 
The results of the OLS regressions would be biased because of the endogeneity 
problem induced by a simultaneous relationship between the dependent variable and 
some explanatory variables. Suppose the quality of the firm and the talents of the 
manager are unobservable but they affect the degree of underpricing and long-term 
performance, as well as option grants. These unobservable factors are not controlled for 
in the OLS regression and a significant coefficient of option grant may be simply 
reflecting a spurious relationship through unobserved quality. The test contains two steps: 
First, Option Grants is regressed on all its determinants in the Option Grants equation (2); 
then, underpricing is regressed on its determinants in the Underpricing equation as well 
as the residual vector generated from step 1. If the coefficient estimate on the residual 
vector is significantly different from 0, then the OLS is inconsistent, the simultaneous 
regression should be used to control for endogeneity. Pre-IPO ownership may similarly 
be determined by the manager's perception of the prospects of the firm. I first regress 
Pre-IPO on all its determinants in equation (3) and then I regress underpricing on all its 
determinants and the vectors of the residuals of Pre-IPO own in equation (1). I finally 
assume Pre-IPO is endogenous in the Option Grants equation (2) by regressing Pre-IPO 
on all its determinants in equation (3) first and then regressing Option Grants on all its 
determinants and the vectors of the residuals of Pre-IPO own in equation (2). 
The results are presented in Table 10 Hausman Test for Endogeneity (Option 
Grants as Dummy) and Table 11 Hausman Test for Endogeneity (Option Grants as 
Value). In Table 10 none of the coefficients on the residuals appear significantly different 
from 0 for the equations containing option grants as dummy variables. But for Table 11 
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when Option Grants is a dollar value, I conclude that both Underpricing and Performance 
may be spuriously related to Option Value, since the coefficients on the residual are all 
significant at 10 percent level. Panel C also indicates that Pre-IPO own is endogenous in 
the Option Grants equation (2). In the following section, I perform a set of simultaneous 
equations regressions to control for this endogeneity. 
6.6 Three-Stage Least Square Regressions 
The three-stage least square regression estimates a simultaneous system of 
structural equations, where some equations contain endogenous variables among the 
predictors. I rely on the results of Hausman test to determine which explanatory variables 
will be treated as endogenous. Specifically, Pre-IPO own is endogenous in the Option 
Value equation (2); Option Values is endogenous in the Underpricing equation (1). 
Results are shown in Table 12 and Table 13. The OLS results are reinforced, where by 
the option dummy is not significantly related to Underpricing. Only the coefficient 
estimates of Market Return are significantly different from 0 in all regressions. For the 
option grants as dollar value in Table 13, Pre-IPO ownership is significantly related to 
option value and all other control variables are significantly related to the total dollar 
value of stock options granted to top executives. I find no evidence that the dollar value 
of options granted to executives is related to underpricing and performance when I 
control for the endogeneity of pre-IPO ownership and stock option value. The OLS 
significance disappears, which is consistent with the suspicion that the significance was 
due to a spurious relation. 
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7. Conclusion and Discussion 
The main purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between 
executive IPO stock option compensation and IPO underpricing of U.S. software 
companies during the period 1996 to 2000. 
I begin by applying OLS regressions on the predictive power on IPO underpricing 
of the choice to grant option compensation to top executives and of the dollar value of the 
options granted. My results indicate that there is no substantial difference in underpricing 
between firms issuing IPO stock option compensation to top executives and firms that 
choose not to. However, I find that the total dollar value of the stock options granted to 
top management and/or CEOs increases with underpricing for the software industry. 
Skeptical of possible sample selection bias, I then do a Heckman sample selection 
filter to test the relationship between Underpricing and Option options controlling for 
censorship. This approach leads to the initial conclusion that option value is positively 
and significantly related to underpricing. To address potential endogeneity, I further run 
Hausman tests and employ 3SLS regressions and find that total option value for 
executives and underpricing/performance are simultaneously related and their positive 
relationship from OLS disappears. 
I conclude no evidence of a significant relation between option grants and 
underpricing for the human-intensified software industry. Additionally, I find that the 
bubble year 1998-2000 have significant explanatory power with regard to the greater IPO 
underpricing for software companies compared to the average industry in the same period. 
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Discussion: Why there is no relation between option grants and underpricing 
(performance) for the software industry? 
a) There may be third factors both affecting option grants and underpricing; 
hence, OLS result indicating a positive relationship would be spurious. For 
example, in our Hausman test and 3SLS regression, we capture this effect by 
adding "Quality-3 year fail" as the quality of the company and CEO traits as 
the quality of the manager. 
b) Options as a percentage of new shares outstanding at the IPO also matters. In 
section 4 I show that executives should own no more than pre-IPO 
x 
shares in order to maximize their benefit by underpricing the IPO. I calculate 
in the sample that the ratio of average executive option numbers out of totals 
X 
shares outstanding is 16.67%,i.e., —=16.67%. This implies that a should be 
y 
no more than 14.29%. However, the descriptive result demonstrates that the 
average pre-IPO ownership for option-granting firms is 63%, which is 
substantially higher than 14.29%. Therefore, the executives' wealth is not 
increasing in the IPO offer price consistent with the lack of significant 
relationship between option grants and underpricing. 
c) If executives also sell shares at the IPO, there can be a "trade-off issue. 
Executives are reluctant to influence the offer price since they would lose 
more by selling their pre-IPO shares in their "intentionally-set" low price at 
the IPO. To illustrate, I calculate the benefit and loss for the sub-sample where 
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both new option grants and shares sold by executives can be observed. The 
total benefit from exercising options is $740,165,146 (average: $6,017,603) 
while the total loss from selling pre-IPO shares is $847,853,107(average: 
$6,893,115). The "trade-off generated when executives exercise all their 
options is $-107,687,961 (average: $-875,512). Apparently, for this set of 
option granting executives, they cannot benefit themselves by setting lower 
strike price for their options. 
d) Option granting executives not influencing the IPO offer price may also be 
due to anticipated EPS dilution and management dilution effect . The dilution 
effect makes executives indifferent in setting lower offer price, since 
executives expect that no matter how low the offer price would be, when they 
exercise the options, the resulting market price due to dilution is not high 
enough to compensate their effort and time in price setting. Therefore, the 
intrinsic value of the options is not of interest to them. 
e) The maturity of executive stock options is another reason why executives may 
find option compensation and offer price setting unattractive. Most executives 
in software firms are granted options with a maturity of ten years or more. 
Software industry firms are risky, with high exposure to takeovers and high 
failure rate. The descriptive results show that the percentage of 3-year fail is 
fairly high. Therefore, executives may expect the firm to fail before they can 
21
 When executives exercise their options, there would be more shares outstanding, which dilutes the 
earnings per share and further deteriorate the stock returns. This is called EPS dilution. Management 
dilution is that management spends more time attempting to maximize their option payouts and financing 
stock buybacks than running the business. 
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exercise the options. Instead, they would prefer to exert effort in current 
"profit maximization" activities, 
f) Following recent business scandals like Enron's bankruptcy, the "grey area" 
of executive compensation has become more regulated and restricted by law. 
In addition, concentrated executive ownership and active institutional 
investors' monitoring role may restrain the executives from "rent seeking" 
activities in IPOs. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
a. Firm characteristics with and without executive stock options granted 
The sample consists of 422 software firms that went public between 1996 and 2000. All the variables 
shown in the table are defined in the thesis. Asterisks denote significance differences between the two 
samples, based on t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
Number of firms 
Underpricing-ld (%) 
Underpricing-lw 
Price Update (%) 
Performance-6 m (%) 
Performance-ly (%) 
Offer Price ($) 
IPO proceeds ($ mil) 
Assets prior to IPO ($mil) 
Underwriter Rank 
Pre-IPO Ownership (%) 





Quality-3year fails (%) 
VC backed (%) 






























































































b. Option Summary Statistics among Option Granting Firms 
This table shows summary statistics of number and value of stock options among option-granting 
companies. Number of options to all executives is the total number of stock options granted to top 
management team. Average number of options to all executives is the number of options to all executives 
divided by the total number of executives. Number of options to CEOs is the total number of stock options 
granted to CEO only. Value of stock options to all executives is the total value of stock options to top 
management team by multiplying number of stock options with Black-Scholes value of stock options 
Average Value of stock options to all executives is the value of stock options to all executives divided by the 
number of executives. Value of stock options to CEOs is the value of stock options granted to CEOs. Black-
Scholes Stock Option Value is computed by Black-Scholes option pricing model using company 
fundamentals. 
NO. of options to all executives 
Average NO. of options to all executives 
NO. of options to CEOs 
Value of options to all executives 
Average Value of options to all executives 
Value of options to CEOs 










































Table 2 Comparison of the Level of Underpricing 
This table compares the average underpricing level of IPO firms with IPO options and without IPO 
options and compares average underpricing of all IPO firms of all industries with software industries from 
1996 to 2000. Asterisks denote significance differences between the two samples, based on t-statistics in 
brackets. When two sample size and the variance are assumed to be unequal, the t statistic to test whether 
X i — X2 
whereSy'" m «2. s1 is the unbiased estimator the means are different can be calculated as s*> 
of the variance of the two samples; n is number of participants for the two samples; the distribution of 
significance test is a Student's t distribution with the degree of freedom: 
D.F.= (sll^ + slimf 
and 10% level. 
•V. (O'Mahony, 1986). ***, **, * Denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
ID in terms of IPO date (435) 
Mean Underpricing (with IPO options) 
Mean Underpricing (no IPO options) 
Std. dev (with IPO options) 
Std. dev (no IPO options) 
Difference 
Mean underpricing of All IPO issues 



















































Figure 1 Underpricing comparison among firms with and without option grants with all-industry 
level 
• o ^ - o ^ - o ^ - o ^ * 
#
 0<f o<f o / ^O o 
• Underpricing-One day (%) 
• Underpricing-One week (%) 
• Price Update (%) 
• Performance-6 month (%) 
• Performance-1 year(%) 
..& 
J? Or / * & $ r 




Table 3 Underpricing Comparison by Years 
This table illustrates the number of new issues by years and compares average underpricing level for 
each year with software industries and with all IPOs among all industries from 1996 to 2000. Asterisks 
denote significance differences between the two samples, based on t-statistics in brackets. When two 
sample size and the variance are assumed to be unequal, the t statistic to test whether the means are 
t _ ^ I - ^2 _ _ _ P i *2 
different can be calculated as s*i-*», where s*'~*2 ~ v ^ + %. s2 is the unbiased estimator of the variance 
of the two samples; n is number of participants for the two samples; the distribution of significance test is a 
D F = (4/ni + 4/n2f 
Student's t distribution with the degree of freedom: ' ' (^M) 2 / (n i - l ) + i4M) 2 / ( "2-D ' . (O'Mahony, 
1986). ***, **, * Denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
IPO year No. of Underpricing- Underpricing- Price Update Performance- Performance-


























































Figure 2 Underpricing comparison each year within industry and with all-industry level 
500 
• No. of IPOs 
• Underpricing-One day (%) 
• Underpricing-One week (%) 
• Price Update (%) 
• Performance-6 month (%) 
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Table 5 Description of Variables 
Panel A: Data Description for Black-Scholes Stock Option Value Calculation 





Offer price at IPO date 
Offer price at IPO date 
Years to maturity 
Standard deviation of firm's post-IPO 6 month daily 
returns standardized to 1 year 
SDC 
Prospectus & SDC 
Prospectus 




on the U.S. government 10-year Treasury notes Yahoo! Finance 
Underpricing-1 d/1 w 
Price Update 
Underpricing-6m/1 y 
Panel B: Dependent Variable 
Percent price change with respect to the offer price for 1 day 
and 1 week 
Percent price change between the offer price and the 
midpoint of the filing range 
Percent price change with respect to the offer price for 6 
months and 1 year 
Panel C: Predictive Variables in Underpricing Equation 













Total option value to executives 
Pre-IPO ownership of executives 
Index market return 
Pre-IPO assets 
Venture capitalist backed dummy 
NASDAQ index 
Underwriter reputation rank 
Firm age 
Founder-led firm dummy 
Year dummies 
If options granted, value=l, or else, value=0 
The product of Black-Scholes option value 
multiplied by the number of options 
The ratio as shares owned by the top 
executives as a fraction of shares outstanding 
prior to the IPO 
Compounded 15-day daily returns before 
IPO on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Composite 
Index 
Logarithm form of the book value of assets, 
adjusted for inflation using the 2000 
Consumer Price Index 
If VC-backed IPO, value=l; or else, value=0 
Price index at the IPO date 
Ranging from zero to 9.1, with higher ranks 
representing higher-quality underwriters 
The difference between the year of IPO and 
the year when the firm founded 
If founder-led IPO, value=l; or else, value=0 





? for other 
years 
Panel D: Variables appeared in both Option Grants Equation and Pre-IPO own Equation 
Quality 
Board Size 
Firm's anticipated performance 
NO. of board of directors 
3 year fail dummy, if IPO firms fail in 3 years, value=l; or 
else, value=0 
CEO Tenure The years CEO served in the position 
65 
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